



Department of State

DECLASSIFIED 2-

TELEGRAM

84 B 416 (FPP)
Box 1083

ACTION: POL-2
INFO: AMB ADCM ECON
PAO DAO AID/D CRN CONS

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE 154272

Classification

AUG 7, 1973

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

R 361438Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUGVLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5008
INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6673
BT

REVIEWED BY

DATE 2/18/85

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 154272

E.O. 11652: GDS

() CLASSIFIED

TAGS: PFOR, AF

() DOWNGRADES to () S or () C, OADR

SUBJ: RELATIONS WITH DAUD GOVERNMENT

1. THIS MESSAGE OUTLINES PRELIMINARY DEPARTMENT THINKING RE AFGHANISTAN'S CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT ON WHICH WE INVITE EMBASSY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
2. OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE: (A) THE CONTINUATION OF AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WILLING AND ABLE TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND (B) THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSER AFGHAN REGIONAL TIES THROUGH THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. UNTIL THE DAUD COUP, THERE WAS POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON THE REGIONAL OBJECTIVE (B) WHICH IN TURN TENDED TO INCREASE AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO KNOW LONG TERM IMPACT OF DAUD ON RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN, BUT MOMENTUM TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS IS IN ABEYANCE BECAUSE DIRECTION DAUD GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE NOT KNOWN, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO IRANIAN AND PAK SUSPICIONS. HOWEVER, CHANGE NEED NOT BE AVERSE TO OUR INTERESTS PROVIDED: (A) DAUD CONTINUES CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US, (B) AVOIDS ACTIONS WHICH CAUSE TROUBLE WITH NEIGHBORS, IN PARTICULAR PAKISTAN.
3. IN PAST COUPLE OF YEARS WE HAVE HAD STRATEGY OF CONTINUING AID, PEACE CORPS, MAP TRAINING, AND USIS PRESENCE AND ACTIVITY IN AFGHANISTAN EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITIES WHERE AFGHAN NEEDS AND OUR CAPABILITIES MET. AT SAME TIME WE HAVE AVOIDED MAJOR NEW COMMITMENTS AND CLEARLY INDICATED PURPOSE WAS DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL ECONOMICALLY AND MAINTAIN MUTUALLY DESIRABLE PRESENCE POLITICALLY, BUT NOT TO COMPETE WITH USSR OR CHINA OR ANYONE ELSE. THE STRATEGY SEEMED WELL SUITED TO PRE-COUP SITUATION, AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED BY PREVIOUS REGIME... QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WILL BE APPRECIATED BY DAUD WHO IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN SOME INDICATIONS THAT HE STILL SEES WORLD IN COLD WAR TERMS OF 1953-63 AND MAY SEEK INCREASED U.S. AID IN RENEWED COMPETITION WITH USSR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 2 STATE 154272

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN, BELIEVE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO AVOID INDICATION THAT WE ARE WILLING TO GET BACK INTO AID COMPETITION WITH USSR IN AFGHANISTAN. ALSO, SEEMS PRUDENT TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION WE LEAPING TO SUPPORT NEW REGIME, BUT RATHER CONTINUE TO ASSIST WITH AFGHAN PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT NEEDS WHICH THEY PREPARED TO SUPPORT AND IMPLEMENT. THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE TO DAUD WITHOUT GIVING IMPRESSION THAT U.S. WISHES PUT GREATER DISTANCE BETWEEN US AND AFGHANS THAN DURING PAST TEN YEARS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE TACTICS FOR NEAR TERM BEFORE NEW GOVERNMENT FULLY IN OPERATIONS AND FOR LONGER TERM. DEPARTMENT TENTATIVE THINKING FOLLOWS.

4. SUREST MEANS TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION OF EAGERNESS TO COMPETE IN ECONOMIC AID IS TO ESCHUE ALL U.S. INITIATIVES IN AID FIELD. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE IMPRESSION WE SEEKING BUSINESS AS USUAL, BUT MAKE IT CLEAR WE AWAIT GOA INITIATIVES. ALTHOUGH NEW REGIME HAS ENDORSED DEVELOPMENT AS HIGH PRIORITY AND INDICATED DESIRE TO CONTINUE U.S. AID PROGRAM, WE BELIEVE THIS REPRESENTS NOTHING MORE THAN GENERALIZED DESIRE AT THIS POINT, AND DOES NOT MEAN IT FULLY UNDERSTANDS RAMIFICATIONS ON-GOING AID PROGRAM, INCLUDING MAGNITUDE GOA AND U.S. COMMITMENT NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT IT. IT WILL TAKE TIME FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH ITSELF, EXAMINE ITS NEEDS, AND SET DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES.

5. WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT WE CANNOT HOLD THIS LINE WITH COMPLETE CONSISTENCY SINCE IT DEPARTS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM PAST PATTERNS AND COULD BE READ AS WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. INTEREST. THUS, FOR ON-GOING AID AND PC PROJECTS FOR WHICH DISCUSSIONS ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT SERIOUS INTERRUPTION OF ACTION, MISSION WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TAKE INITIATIVE UP TO AND INCLUDING AMBASSADOR GOING TO DAUD IF NECESSARY FOR INDICATION AS TO AFGHAN ATTITUDES REGARDING ON-GOING PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES. FOR PROJECTS STILL IN PLANNING STAGE SUCH AS RURAL WORKS, AG EXTENSION, FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITY IN HELMAND VALLEY OR KU, OUR INCLINATION WOULD BE TO TAKE NO INITIATIVE AT MOMENT. IN NEAR FUTURE WE WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS OF KAJAKAI PROJECT AND FALL REVIEW OF FERTILIZER PROGRAM. (BOTH OF WHICH ARE ON-GOING BUT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FINANCING), BUT FEEL THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE SUCCESSFULLY WHEN RESPONSIBLE GOA OFFICIAL DESIGNATED



Department of State
DECLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

PAGE 3 STATE 154272

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FROM WHOM WE COULD SEEK CLARIFICATION GOA DESIRES AND INTENTIONS.

6. IT APPEARS FROM KABUL 5674 DAUD MAY ALREADY HAVE SEEN VALUE TO AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS WITH U.S. IN REITERATING PREVIOUS REGIME'S CONCERN FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL. AS MEANS STIMULATING GOVERNMENT TO PUT POPPY CONTROL ON ITS PRIORITY LIST, OUR NEXT STEP MIGHT BE TO ENCOURAGE UNFDAC TO MAKE EARLY CONTACT WITH DAUD GOVERNMENT TO OUTLINE PRESENT PROPOSED UN PROGRAM AND SEEK ITS SUPPORT. UNFDAC ALSO MAY WISH SEEK GOA REACTION TO RESCHEDULING GENEVA MEETING AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNE TIME. FOR THE PRESENT, U.S. APPROACH TO GOA WOULD BE LIMITED TO AN EXPRESSION OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST THIS AREA AND SUGGESTION THAT GOA UNDERTAKE EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH UNFDAC THIS MATTER. (FYI: WE ARE OF COURSE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN POST-COUP STATUS OF POLICE AND MOJ INVESTIGATIVE UNIT, AND APPRECIATE EMBASSY BEING ALERT TO REPORTING ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT THESE OR OTHER ITEMS NOW ON SHOPPING LIST. END FYI.)

7. ULTIMATELY, AFTER NEW GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS FORMULATED, MISSION WOULD UNDERTAKE IN DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH DESIGNATED GOA OFFICIALS ON U.S. OBJECTIVES OF ALL ON-GOING AID PROGRAMS AND U.S. AND GOA COMMITMENT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THESE PROGRAMS.

8. ONE ASSUMPTION OF THESE TACTICAL IDEAS, ON WHICH WE ARE ASKING YOUR COMMENTS, IS THAT DAUD WILL RECOGNIZE THAT HE NEEDS US MORE THAN WE NEED HIM, THAT HE WILL THEREFORE ASK US TO STAY ON OUR TERMS, RATHER THAN ACCEPT OUR CONTINUING PRESENCE ON HIS TERMS, A STRATEGY WHICH HE USED SO SUCCESSFULLY IN THE 1950'S. WE BELIEVE THAT DAUD WILL WISH NOT TO BE FORCED INTO POSITION OF GREATER RELIANCE ON USSR IN PERIOD WHEN AFGHANISTAN IS FACED WITH INCREASED SUSPICIONS FROM OTHER NEIGHBORS. WE HOPE THAT DAUD WILL UNDERSTAND THAT AFGHANISTAN HAS NOTHING TO GAIN IN INCREASING POLARIZATION OF REGION. AT SAME TIME, OF COURSE, WE DO HAVE SIMILAR INTEREST IN PREVENTING POLARIZATION, AND WISH BE IN POSITION TO EXERT SOME RESTRAINING INFLUENCE IN KABUL SHOULD TENSIONS INCREASE WITH PAKISTAN AND/OR IRAN. BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DO THIS AS PART OF "CONTINUING WARM AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS," WITHOUT A DAUD STIMULATED INCREASE IN PRICE TAG TO USG.